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Logics of Essence and Accident
Jie Fan
Abstract
In the literature, essence is formalized in two different ways, either
de dicto, or de re. Following [11], we adopt its de dicto formalization: a
formula is essential, if once it is true, it is necessarily true; otherwise, it is
accidental. In this article, we study the model theory and axiomatization
of the logic of essence and accident, i.e. the logic with essence operator (or
accident operator) as the only primitive modality. We show that the logic
of essence and accident is less expressive than modal logic on non-reflexive
models, but the two logics are equally expressive on reflexive models. We
prove that some frame properties are undefinable in the logic of essence
and accident, while some are. We propose the suitable bisimulation for
this logic, based on which we characterize the expressive power of this logic
within modal logic and within first-order logic. We axiomatize this logic
over various frame classes, among which the symmetric case is missing,
and our method is more suitable than those in the literature. We also find
a method to compute certain axioms used to axiomatize this logic over
special frames in the literature. As a side effect, we answer some open
questions raised in [11].
Keywords: essence, accident, expressivity, frame definability, bisimulation, ax-
iomatization
1 Introduction
As far back as Aristotle, like the notions of necessity, possibility and contingency,
the notion of essence can also be related either to propositions (de dicto) or to
objects (de re). The importance of the notion of essence is argued in [5].
The formalization of essence in terms of de re at least tracks back to Kit
Fine. In his writing [6], a logic of essence is proposed, where formulas of the
form Fϕ express that ϕ is true in virtue of the essence of objects which F .
A Hilbert-style quantified system E5 is given but without a semantics. In [7],
a possible worlds semantics is presented, and a variant of E5 is shown to be
sound and complete for the semantics. In [2], a propositional version of E5 is
established in accompany with an appropriate semantics, and it is shown that
the system is sound and complete with respect to the proposed semantics. A
new semantics for logics of essence is proposed in [8].
There are also researchers who formalize essence in terms of de dicto. In [12],
in reconstructing Go¨del’s ontological argument, accidental truth, i.e. accident
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is formalized as ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ, i.e. true but not necessarily true. Accordingly, as
the negation of accident, essence is formalized as ϕ → ϕ. It is said that the
discussions of essential and accidental propositions at least tracks back to the
XIX Century, see [11, p. 53]. A logic of essence and accident is introduced in
which essence is treated in the metaphysical usage in [11], where a complete
axiomatization for the logic is shown with respect to the class of all frames. A
simple axiomatization for arbitrary frames and its extensions over various frame
classes are proposed in [13], but the case for symmetric frames is missing. Even
though the completeness proofs thereof are simple, his method has a defect:
on one hand, the canonical relation, thus the canonical frame, is automatically
provided to be reflexive; on the other hand, the underlying semantics is defined
on arbitrary frames, rather than on reflexive frames. This means that there is
a non-correspondence between syntax and semantics in the logic of essence and
accident. Oblivious to the literature on the logic of essence and accident, in [14]
the author provides a topological semantics for a logic of unknown truths and
shows its completeness over the class of S4 models.
The accident operator has various meanings in different contexts. For in-
stance, in the setting of provability logic, ‘accident’ means ‘true but unprovable’,
thus ‘ϕ is accident’ means ‘ϕ is a Go¨del sentence’ [10]; in the setting of epistemic
logic, ‘accident’ means ‘unknown truths’, thus ‘ϕ is accident’ means ‘ϕ is true
but unknown to the agent’ [14].
In this article, we will follow the formalization of essence in [11], study the
notions of essence and accident from viewpoint of de dicto. We will discuss the
model theory of the logic of essence and accident, propose some axiomatizations,
whose completeness are shown with a more suitable method than those in the
literature, and give an automatic method to compute certain axioms needed to
characterize this logic over special frames.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the language of the
logic of essence and accident. Section 3 compares the relative expressive power
of the logic of essence and accident and modal logic. Section 4 explores the
frame definability. We propose the bisimulation notion suitable for the logic of
essence and accident in Section 5, based on which we characterize the expressive
power of this logic within modal logic and within first-order logic in Section 6.
Section 7 axiomatizes the logic of essence and accident over various frames. In
Section 8, we compare our work with the literature on the logic of essence and
accident and the modal logic of Go¨del sentence. We conclude with some future
work in Section 9.
2 Language and Semantics
First, we introduce the following language with essence operator and necessity
operator as modalities, although we will focus on the language of logic of essence
and accident.
Definition 1 (Logical language L(◦,)). Let P be a set of propositional vari-
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ables, the logical language L(◦,) is defined as follows:
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | (ϕ ∧ ϕ) | ◦ϕ | ϕ
where p ∈ P. Without the construct ◦ϕ, we obtain the language of modal logic
L(); without the construct ϕ, we obtain the language of essence and accident
L(◦). If ϕ ∈ L(◦,), we say ϕ is an L(◦,)-formula; if ϕ ∈ L(), we say ϕ is
an L()-formula; if ϕ ∈ L(◦), we say ϕ is an L(◦)-formula.
Intuitively, ◦ϕ is read ‘it is essential that ϕ’, and ϕ is read ‘it is necessary
that ϕ’. Other operators are defined as usual; in particular, •ϕ is defined as
¬ ◦ ϕ, read ‘it is accidental that ϕ’. Note that • is not the dual of ◦.
Definition 2 (Model). A frame is a tuple F = 〈S,R〉, where S is a nonempty
set of possible worlds, R is a binary relation over S. A model is a tuple M =
〈F , V 〉, where V is a valuation function from P to P(S). A pointed model
(M, s) is a model M with a designated world s in M. We always omit the
parentheses around (M, s) whenever convenient. We sometimes write s ∈ M
for s ∈ S. We write R(s) = {t ∈ S | sRt}. We write FT for the class of
reflexive frames.
Definition 3 (Semantics). Given a pointed model (M, s) and an L(◦,)-
formula ϕ, the satisfaction relation  is defined as follows:1
M, s  p ⇔ s ∈ V (p)
M, s  ¬ϕ ⇔ M, s 2 ϕ
M, s  ϕ ∧ ψ ⇔ M, s  ϕ & M, s  ψ
M, s  ◦ϕ ⇔ (M, s  ϕ⇒ ∀t(sRt⇒M, t  ϕ))
M, s  ϕ ⇔ ∀t(sRt⇒M, t  ϕ)
If M, s  ϕ, we say ϕ is true, or satisfied at (M, s), sometimes we write s  ϕ;
if for all s ∈ M we have M, s  ϕ, we say ϕ is valid on M and write M  ϕ;
if for all M based on F we have M  ϕ, we say ϕ is valid on F and write
F  ϕ; if for all F in a class of frames F we have F  ϕ, we say ϕ is valid
on F and write F  ϕ; if the class of frames F in question is arbitrary, then
we say ϕ is valid and write  ϕ. We say ϕ is satisfiable, if 2 ¬ϕ. The case
for a set of formula is similarly defined. Given any two pointed models (M, s)
and (N , t), if they satisfy the same L(◦)-formulas, we say they are ◦-equivalent,
notation: (M, s) ≡◦ (N , t); if they satisfy the same L()-formulas, we say they
are -equivalent, notation: (M, s) ≡ (N , t).
Under the semantics, it is not hard to show that
Proposition 4. Let ϕ ∈ L(◦,). Then FT  ϕ ↔ ϕ ∧ ◦ϕ and FT  ♦ϕ ↔
(ϕ ∨ ¬ ◦ ¬ϕ).
Proposition 4 is very important. It guides us to find the desired axioms for
characterizing L(◦) over certain frame classes, as we will see in Section 7.
1We here use the notation &, ∀,⇒,⇔, respectively, to stand for the metalanguage ‘and’,
‘for all’, ‘if · · · then · · · ’, ‘if and only if’.
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3 Expressivity
In this section, we compare the relative expressivity of L(◦) and L(). A related
technical definition is introduced as follows.
Definition 5 (Expressivity). Let logical languages L1 and L2 be interpreted on
the same class M of models,
• L2 is at least as expressive as L1, notation: L1  L1, if for any ϕ ∈ L1,
there exists ψ ∈ L2 such that for all (M, s) ∈M , we have M, s  ϕ↔ ψ.
• L1 and L2 are equally expressive, notation: L1 ≡ L2, if L1  L2 and
L2  L1.
• L1 is less expressive than L2, or L2 is more expressive than L1, notation:
L1 ≺ L2, if L1  L2 and L2 6 L1.
Proposition 6. L(◦) is less expressive than L() on the class of K-models,
B-models, 4-models, 5-models.
Proof. Define a translation t from L(◦) to L():
t(⊤) = ⊤
t(p) = p
t(¬ϕ) = ¬t(ϕ)
t(ϕ ∧ ψ) = t(ϕ) ∧ t(ψ)
t(◦ϕ) = t(ϕ)→ t(ϕ)
It is clear that t is a truth-preserving translation. Therefore L() is at least
as expressive as L(◦).
Now consider the following pointed models (M, s) and (N , t), which can
be distinguished by an L()-formula ⊥, but cannot be distinguished by any
L(◦)-formulas:
M : s : p

N : t : p
It is easy to checkM and N are both symmetric, transitive, and Euclidean.
By induction we prove that for all ϕ ∈ L(◦), M, s  ϕ iff N , t  ϕ. The base
cases and boolean cases are straightforward. For the case of ◦ϕ, it is not hard
to show that M, s  ◦ϕ and N , t  ◦ϕ (note that here we do not need to use
the induction hypothesis), thus M, s  ◦ϕ iff N , t  ◦ϕ, as desired.
As for the case of D-models, the result about the relative expressivity of
L(◦) and L() is same as previous, but the proof is much more sophisticated,
which needs simultaneous induction.
Proposition 7. L(◦) is less expressive than L() on the class of D-models.
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Proof. By the translation t in the proof of Proposition 6, we have L(◦)  L().
Consider the following pointed models (M, s) and (N , s′), which can be
distinguished by an L()-formula p, but cannot be distinguished by any
L(◦)-formulas:
M : s : p // t : ¬p

oo N : s′ : p // t′ : ¬poo
It is not hard to see thatM andN are both serial. By induction on ϕ ∈ L(◦),
we show simultaneously that for all ϕ, (i) M, s  ϕ iff N , s′  ϕ, and (ii)
M, t  ϕ iff N , t′  ϕ. The nontrivial case is ◦ϕ.
For (i), we have the following equivalences:
M, s  ◦ϕ
semantics
⇐⇒ s  ϕ implies t  ϕ
IH for (i)
⇐⇒ s′  ϕ implies t  ϕ
(ii)
⇐⇒ s′  ϕ implies t′  ϕ
semantics
⇐⇒ N , s′  ◦ϕ
M, t  ◦ϕ
semantics
⇐⇒ t  ϕ implies (s  ϕ and t  ϕ)
⇐⇒ t  ϕ implies s  ϕ
IH for (ii)
⇐⇒ t′  ϕ implies s  ϕ
(i)
⇐⇒ t′  ϕ implies s′  ϕ
semantics
⇐⇒ N , t′  ◦ϕ
Therefore, (M, s) and (N , s′) cannot be distinguished by any L(◦)-formulas.
However, on the T -models, the situation is different.
Proposition 8. L(◦) and L() are equally expressive on the class of T -models.
Proof. By the translation t in the proof of Proposition 6, we have L(◦)  L().
Now define another translation t′ from L() to L(◦), where the base cases and
Boolean cases are similar to the corresponding cases for t, and t′(ϕ) = ◦t′(ϕ)∧
t′(ϕ). It is straightforward to show that t′ is a truth-preserving translation, due
to Prop. 4. Thus L()  L(◦), and therefore L(◦) ≡ L().
4 Frame correspondence
In [11, Corollary 4.3], the five basic frame properties, except for symmetry, are
shown by using the method of mirror reduction, to be undefinable in L(◦). As
an open question (Open 4.4 there), the author would like to know which frame
properties are definable in L(◦). This question is answered partly in [13], where
the following results are established.
Proposition 9. [13, Prop. 2.2, Prop. 2.5, Prop. 3.8]
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1. [13, Prop. 2.2 without proof] The property of weak transitivity, viz. ∀x∀y∀z(xRy∧
yRz ∧ x 6= z → xRz), is defined by ◦p ∧ p→ ◦(◦p ∧ p). Thus the property
of weak transitivity is definable in L(◦).
2. [13, Prop. 2.5] The property of weak connectedness, viz. ∀x∀y∀z(xRy ∧
xRz → yRz ∨ y = z ∨ zRy), is defined by ◦(◦p ∧ p → q) ∨ ◦(◦q ∧ q → p).
Thus the property of weak connectedness is definable in L(◦).
3. [13, Prop. 3.8 without proof] The property of weak-weak-Euclidicity, viz.
∀x∀y∀z(xRy ∧ xRz ∧ x 6= z ∧ y 6= z → yRz), is defined by ¬ ◦ ¬p →
◦(◦¬p → p). Thus the property of weak-weak-Euclidicity is definable in
L(◦).
In this section, we first answer affirmatively the case for symmetry, thus
completing the spectrum of cases for the five basic frame properties. Apart
from this, we will also give other results.
Proposition 10. The frame property of symmetry is definable in L(◦).
Proof. Given any frame F = 〈S,R〉. We show that
F  ∀x∀y(xRy → yRx) iff F  p→ ◦(◦¬p→ p).
Left-to-right: Suppose that F is symmetric, to show F  p → ◦(◦¬p → p).
For this, letM be an arbitrary model based on F and any s ∈ S. Assume that
that M, s  p (thus s  ◦¬p → p) and t is a successor of s such that t  ◦¬p.
As R is symmetric, tRs. If t  ¬p, then by the semantics of ◦, we should have
s  ¬p, contrary to the assumption. Then t  p, and thus t  ◦¬p → p. Since
t is arbitrary, we have s  ◦(◦¬p → p). Therefore s  p → ◦(◦¬p → p), as
desired.
Right-to-left: Suppose that F is not symmetric, to show F 2 p→ ◦(◦¬p→
p). By assumption, there exist s, t ∈ S such that sRt but not tRs, thus s 6= t.
Define a valuation V on F as V (p) = {s}. Obviously, 〈F , V 〉, s  p, thus
s  ◦¬p → p. Furthermore, t  ¬p, and given any u such that tRu, we have
u 6= s, thus u  ¬p, hence t  ◦¬p ∧ ¬p, viz. t 2 ◦¬p → p. From this and
s  ◦¬p→ p, it follows that s 2 ◦(◦¬p→ p), then 〈F , V 〉, s 2 p→ ◦(◦¬p→ p).
We now conclude that F 2 p→ ◦(◦¬p→ p).
Proposition 11. The frame property of coreflexivity, viz. ∀x∀y(xRy → x = y),
is defined by ◦p. Thus coreflexivity is definable in L(◦).
Proof. Let F = 〈S,R〉. We will show that F  ∀x∀y(xRy → x = y) iff F  ◦p.
Suppose that F  ∀x∀y(xRy → x = y). Then given anyM based on F and
any s ∈ S, if for each t with sRt, we have s = t, then s  p implies t  p, and
thus s  ◦p. Therefore F  ◦p.
Conversely, suppose that F 2 ∀x∀y(xRy → x = y). Then there are s, t ∈ S
such that sRt but s 6= t. Define a valuation V on F such that V (p) = {s}, then
s  p but t 2 p, and thus 〈F , V 〉, s 2 ◦p. Therefore F 2 ◦p.
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The following result is an equivalent but different form of Proposition 9, item
1 and item 3, respectively. For the proof details we refer to Appendix A.
Proposition 12.
1. The frame property ∀x∀y∀z(xRy ∧ yRz ∧ x 6= y ∧ y 6= z ∧ x 6= z → xRz)
is defined by ◦p ∧ p→ ◦(◦p ∧ p).
2. The frame property ∀x∀y∀z(xRy ∧ xRz ∧ x 6= y ∧ x 6= z ∧ y 6= z → yRz)
is defined by ¬ ◦ ¬p→ ◦(◦¬p→ p).
5 Bisimulation
In this section, we propose the suitable notion of bisimulation for the logic of
essence and accident L(◦). It is announced but without definitions or proofs
in [3] that the bisimulation for L(◦) is similar to that for the logic of strong
noncontingency L(N).
We first recall the standard notion of bisimulation for modal logic L().
Definition 13 (-bisimulation). Let M = 〈S,R, V 〉 and M′ = 〈S′, R′, V ′〉. A
nonempty binary relation Z is called a -bisimulation between M and M′, if
sZs′ implies that the following conditions are satisfied:
(Inv) for all p ∈ P, s ∈ V (p) iff s′ ∈ V ′(p);
(-Forth) if sRt for some t, then there is a t′ such that s′Rt′ and tZt′;
(-Back) if s′Rt′ for some t′, then there is a t such that sRt and tZt′.
We say that (M, s) and (M′, s′) are -bisimilar, notation: (M, s) ↔
(M′, s′), if there exists a -bisimulation Z between M and M′ such that sZs′.
When the models involved are clear, we write it s ↔ s
′ for brevity.
The following result will be used in Proposition 18.
Proposition 14. Let M = 〈S,R, V 〉 and M′ = 〈S′, R′, V ′〉 be two models, and
s ∈ S and s′ ∈ S′. Then (M, s) ↔ (M
′, s′) implies the following conditions:
1. For all p ∈ P, s ∈ V (p) iff s′ ∈ V ′(p);
2. If sRt, then there is a t′ in M′ such that s′R′t′ and t ↔ t
′;
3. If s′R′t′, then there is a t in M such that sRt and t ↔ t
′.
Proof. Follows directly from the fact that↔ is a -bisimulation and the defin-
ition of -bisimulation.
However, the notion of -bisimulation is too refined for the logic L(◦), as
will be shown below. The following example arises in the proof of Proposition
6:
M : s : p

N : t : p
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It is not hard to show thatM and N are both image-finite models, and that
(M, s) and (N , t) satisfy the same L(◦)-formulas, but they are not -bisimilar.
Therefore, we need to redefine a suitable notion of bisimulation for L(◦).
Definition 15 (◦-bisimulation). Let M = 〈S,R, V 〉. A nonempty binary rela-
tion Z over S is called a ◦-bisimulation onM, if sZs′ implies that the following
conditions are satisfied:
(Inv) for all p ∈ P, s ∈ V (p) iff s′ ∈ V (p);
(◦-Forth) if sRt and (s, t) /∈ Z for some t, then there is a t′ such that s′Rt′
and tZt′;
(◦-Back) if s′Rt′ and (s′, t′) /∈ Z for some t′, then there is a t such that sRt
and tZt′.
We say that (M, s) and (M′, s′) are ◦-bisimilar, notation: (M, s) ↔◦
(M′, s′), if there exists a ◦-bisimulation Z on the disjoint union of M and
M′ such that sZs′.
The following proposition states that we can build more sophisticated ◦-
bisimulations from the simpler ones. For the proof details we refer to Appendix
A.
Proposition 16. If Z and Z ′ are both ◦-bisimulations on M, then Z ∪ Z ′ is
also a ◦-bisimulation on M.
In particular, by Definition 15, one can see that ◦-bisimilarity is the largest
◦-bisimulation. And also, ◦-bisimilarity is an equivalence relation. Note that
the proof is highly nontrivial. For the proof details we refer to Appendix A.
Proposition 17. The ◦-bisimilarity ↔◦ is an equivalence relation.
The following proposition indicates the relationship between ◦-bisimilarity
and -bisimilarity: ◦-bisimilarity is strictly weaker than -bisimilarity. This
corresponds to the fact that L(◦) is strictly weaker than L().
Proposition 18. Let (M, s) and (M′, s′) be pointed models. If (M, s) ↔
(M′, s′), then (M, s)↔◦ (M
′, s′); but the converse does not hold.
Proof. Suppose that (M, s) ↔ (M
′, s′). Define Z = {(x, x′) | x ↔ x
′, x ∈
M, x′ ∈ M′}. We will show that Z is a ◦-bisimulation on the disjoint union of
M and M′ with sZs′.
First, by supposition, we have sZs′, thus Z is nonempty. We need only check
that Z satisfies the three conditions of ◦-bisimulation. Assume that xZx′. By
definition of Z, we obtain x↔ x
′. Using item 1 of Proposition 14, we have x
and x′ satisfy the same propositional variables, thus (Inv) holds. For (◦-Forth),
suppose that xRy and (x, y) /∈ Z for some y, then using item 2 of Proposition 14,
we get there exists y′ in M′ such that x′R′y′ and y ↔ y
′, thus yZy′. The
proof for condition (◦-Back) is similar, by using item 3 of Proposition 14.
For the converse, recall the example in Proposition 6. There, let Z =
{(s, s), (s, t)}. It is not hard to show that Z is a ◦-bisimulation on the dis-
joint union of M and N , thus (M, s) ↔◦ (N , t). However, (M, s) 6↔ (N , t),
as M, s 2 ⊥ but N , t  ⊥.
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The following result says that L(◦)-formulas are invariant under ◦-bisimilarity.
This means that L(◦)-formulas cannot distinguish ◦-bisimilar models.
Proposition 19. Let (M, s) and (M′, s′) be pointed models. If (M, s) ↔◦
(M′, s′), then (M, s) ≡◦ (M′, s′). In other words, ◦-bisimilarity implies ◦-
equivalence.
Proof. Assume that (M, s) ↔◦ (M′, s′), then there is a ◦-bisimulation Z on
the disjoint union of M and M′ such that sZs′. We need to show that for any
ϕ ∈ L(◦), M, s  ϕ iff M′, s′  ϕ.
The proof continues by induction on the structure of ϕ. The non-trivial case
is ◦ϕ.
Suppose that M, s 2 ◦ϕ. Then s  ϕ but there exists t such that sRt and
t 2 ϕ. By the induction hypothesis, (s, t) /∈ Z. Then by (◦-Forth) that there
exists t′ such that s′R′t′ and tZt′, thus (M, t) ↔◦ (M′, t′). From s ↔◦ s′ and
the induction hypothesis and s  ϕ, it follows that s′  ϕ. Analogously, we can
infer t′ 2 ϕ. Therefore M′, s′ 2 ◦ϕ. For the converse use (◦-Back).
With the notion of ◦-bisimulation, we can simplify the proofs in the previous
sections. We here take Proposition 7 as an example, to show that (M, s) and
(N , s′) therein are ◦-bisimilar, rather than using simultaneous induction. For
this, we define Z = {(s, s′), (t, t′), (t, t)}2. We can show that Z is indeed a
◦-bisimulation on the disjoint union of M and N , thus (M, s)↔◦ (N , s′).
For the converse, we have
Proposition 20 (Hennessy-Milner Theorem). Let M and M′ be both image-
finite models and s ∈ M and s′ ∈ M′. Then (M, s) ≡◦ (M′, s′) iff (M, s) ↔◦
(M′, s′).
Proof. Let M and M′ be both image-finite models and s ∈ M and s′ ∈ M′.
Based on Proposition 19, we need only to show the direction from left to right.
Assume that (M, s) ≡◦ (M
′, s′), we need to show that ≡◦ is a ◦-bisimulation on
the disjoint union of M and M′, which implies (M, s) ↔◦ (M′, s′). It suffices
to show the condition (◦-Forth), as the proof for (◦-Back) is similar.
Suppose that there exists t such that sRt and s 6≡◦ t, to show for some
t′ it holds that s′R′t′ and t ≡◦ t′. Since s 6≡◦ t, there is a ϕ ∈ L(◦) such
that s  ϕ but t 2 ϕ, and thus s 2 ◦ϕ due to sRt. By assumption, we have
s′  ϕ and s′ 2 ◦ϕ, and thus there exists v′ such that s′R′v′ and v′ 2 ϕ. Let
S′ = {t′ ∈ M′ | s′R′t′}. It is easy to see that S′ 6= ∅. As M′ is image-finite, S′
must be finite, say S′ = {t′1, t
′
2, · · · , t
′
n}. If there is no t
′
i ∈ S
′ such that t ≡◦ t
′
i,
then for every t′
i
∈ S′ there exists ϕi ∈ L(◦) such that t  ϕi but t′i 2 ϕi. It
follows that t  ϕ1 ∧· · · ∧ϕn, and thus t 2 ϕ1 ∧· · · ∧ϕn → ϕ; furthermore, from
s  ϕ follows that s  ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ϕn → ϕ. Hence s 2 ◦(ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ϕn → ϕ). Note
that for all t′
i
∈ S′, t′
i
2 ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ϕn, thus t′i  ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ϕn → ϕ. We also have
s′  ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ϕn → ϕ, and then s′  ◦(ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ϕn → ϕ), which is contrary
2Note that in order to guarantee Z is indeed a ◦-bisimulation, the pair (t, t) must be
contained in Z.
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to the assumption and s 2 ◦(ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ϕn → ϕ). Therefore, we have for some
t′ it holds that s′R′t′ and t ≡◦ t′.
If we remove the condition of ‘image-finite’, then ↔◦ does not coincide with
≡◦.
Example 21. Consider two models M = 〈S,R, V 〉 and M′ = 〈S′, R′, V ′〉,
where S = N ∪ {s}, R = {(s, n) | n ∈ N}, V (pn) = {n} and S′ = N ∪ {s′, ω},
R′ = {(s′, n) | n ∈ N} ∪ {(s′, ω)}, and V ′(pn) = {n}. This can be visualized as
follows:
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We have:
• Neither of M and M′ is image-finite, as s and s′ both have infinite many
successors.
• (M, s) ≡◦ (M′, s′). By induction on ϕ ∈ L(◦), we show that for any
ϕ, M, s  ϕ iff M′, s′  ϕ. The non-trivial case is ◦ϕ, that is to show,
M, s  ◦ϕ iff M′, s′  ◦ϕ. The direction from right to left follows directly
from R(s) ⊆ R′(s′). For the other direction, suppose that M, s  ◦ϕ.
Then s  ϕ implies for any n ∈ N, n  ϕ. By the induction hypothesis,
s′  ϕ implies for any n ∈ N, n  ϕ. As ϕ is finite, it contains only
finitely many propositional variables. Without loss of generality, we may
assume that n is the largest number of subscripts of propositional variables
occurring in ϕ. Then by induction on ϕ, we can show that n + 1  ϕ iff
ω  ϕ. Thus s′  ϕ implies for any n ∈ N ∪ {ω}, n  ϕ. Therefore
M′, s′  ◦ϕ, as desired.
• (M, s) 6↔◦ (M′, s′). Suppose, for a contradiction, that (M, s) ↔◦ (M′, s′),
then there exists a ◦-bisimulation Z such that sZs′. Now we have s′R′ω.
And also (s′, ω) /∈ Z, for otherwise s′ ↔◦ ω, thus e.g. s
′  ◦¬p1 iff
ω  ◦¬p1, contrary to the fact that s′ 2 ◦¬p1 but ω  ◦¬p1. By the con-
dition (◦-Back), we obtain that there exists m ∈ N such that sRm and
mZω, thus m ↔◦ ω. However, m  pm but ω 2 pm, contradiction.
Proposition 20 can be extended to the following stronger proposition. Here
by L(◦)-saturated model we mean, given any s in this model and any set Γ ⊆
L(◦), if all of finite subsets of Γ are satisfiable in the successors of s, then Γ is
also satisfiable in the successors of s.
Proposition 22. Let M and M′ be both L(◦)-saturated models and s ∈ M
and s′ ∈ M′. Then (M, s) ≡◦ (M′, s′) iff (M, s)↔◦ (M′, s′).
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Proof. Based on Proposition 19, we need only show the direction from left to
right.
Let M = 〈S,R, V 〉 and M′ = 〈S′, R′, V ′〉 be both L(◦)-saturated models.
Suppose that (M, s) ≡◦ (M′, s′), we will show that ≡◦ is a ◦-bisimulation on
the disjoint union of M and M′, which implies (M, s) ↔◦ (M
′, s′). It suffices
to show the condition (◦-Forth) holds, as the proof of (◦-Back) is similar.
Assume that sRt and s 6≡◦ t for some t, to show there exists t′ such that
s′R′t′ and t ≡◦ t′. Let Γ = {ϕ ∈ L(◦) | t  ϕ}. It is clear that t  Γ. Then for
any finite Σ ⊆ Γ, t 
∧
Σ. As s 6≡◦ t, there exists ψ ∈ L(◦) such that s  ψ but
t 2 ψ, thus s 
∧
Σ → ψ but t 2
∧
Σ → ψ, hence s 2 ◦(
∧
Σ → ψ). If for any
u′ with s′R′u′ we have u′ 2
∧
Σ, then u′ 
∧
Σ → ψ. Since s ≡◦ s′ and s  ψ,
it follows that s′  ψ, thus s′ 
∧
Σ → ψ, hence s′  ◦(
∧
Σ → ψ), contrary to
s ≡◦ s
′ and s 2 ◦(
∧
Σ → ψ). Therefore there exists u′ such that s′R′u′ and
u′ 
∧
Σ. Because M′ is L(◦)-saturated, for some t′ we have s′R′t′ and t′  Γ.
Furthermore, t ≡◦ t′: given any ϕ ∈ L(◦), if t  ϕ, then ϕ ∈ Γ, hence t′  ϕ; if
t 2 ϕ, i.e., t  ¬ϕ, then ¬ϕ ∈ Γ, hence t′  ¬ϕ, i.e., t′ 2 ϕ, as desired.
The condition ‘L(◦)-saturated’ is also indispensable, which can also be il-
lustrated with Example 21. In that example, M is not L(◦)-saturated. To see
this point, note that the set {¬p1,¬p2, · · · ,¬pn} is finitely satisfiable in the
successors of s, but the set itself is not satisfiable in the successors of s. In the
meantime, (M, s) ≡◦ (M′, s′) but (M, s) 6↔◦ (M′, s′).
We have seen from Definition 15 that the notion of ◦-bisimulation is quite
different from that of-bisimulation. However, it is surprising that the notion of
◦-bisimulation contraction is very similar to that of -bisimulation contraction,
by simply replacing ↔ with ↔◦.
Definition 23 (◦-bisimulation contraction). Let M = 〈S,R, V 〉 be a model.
The ◦-bisimulation contraction ofM is the quotient structure [M] = 〈[S], [R], [V ]〉
such that
• [S] = {[s] | s ∈ S}, where [s] = {t ∈ S | s ↔◦ t};
• [s][R][t] iff there exist s′ ∈ [s] and t′ ∈ [t] such that s′Rt′;
• [V ](p) = {[s] | s ∈ V (p)} for all p ∈ P.
Under this definition, we obtain that the contracted model (via ↔◦) is ◦-
bisimilar to the original one, and that the S5-model property is preserved under
◦-bisimulation contraction. For the proof details we refer to Appendix A.
Proposition 24. LetM = 〈S,R, V 〉 be a model, and let [M] = 〈[S], [R], [V ]〉 be
the ◦-bisimulation contraction ofM. Then for any s ∈ S, we have ([M], [s]) ↔◦
(M, s).
Proposition 25. Let M = 〈S,R, V 〉 be a model, and let [M] = 〈[S], [R], [V ]〉
be the ◦-bisimulation contraction of M. If M is an S5-model, then [M] is also
an S5-model.
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6 Characterization Results
As  ◦ϕ ↔ (ϕ → ϕ), the logic of essence and accident can be seen as a
fragment of standard modal logic, and thus also a fragment of first-order logic.
In this section we characterize the logic of essence and accident within standard
modal logic and within first-order logic. To make our exposition self-contained,
we introduce some definitions and results from e.g. [1] without proofs, refer to
Appendix B.
Since L(◦) can be viewed as a fragment of L(), every L(◦)-formula can be
seen as an L()-formula. By Proposition 46, we have
Lemma 26. Let M be a model and s ∈ M. Then ue(M) is L(◦)-saturated
and (M, s) ≡◦ (ue(M), pis).
From Lemma 26 and Proposition 22, it follows that
Lemma 27. Let (M, s) and (N , t) be pointed models. Then (M, s) ≡◦ (N , t)
implies (ue(M), pis) ↔◦ (ue(N ), pit).
We are now close to prove two characterization results: the logic of essence
and accident is the ◦-bisimulation-invariant fragment of standard modal logic
and of first-order logic. In the following, by an L()-formula ϕ (resp. a first-
order formula α) is invariant under ◦-bisimulation, we mean for any models
(M, s) and (N , t), if (M, s) ↔◦ (N , t), then M, s  ϕ iff N , t  ϕ (resp.
M, s  α iff N , t  α).
Theorem 28. An L()-formula is equivalent to an L(◦)-formula iff it is in-
variant under ◦-bisimulation.
Proof. Based on Proposition 19, we need only show that the direction from
right to left. For this, suppose that an L()-formula ϕ is invariant under ◦-
bisimulation.
LetMOC(ϕ) = {t(ψ) | ψ ∈ L(◦), ϕ  t(ψ)}, where t is a translation function
which recursively translates every L(◦)-formula into the corresponding L()-
formulas; in particular, t(◦ψ) = t(ψ)→ t(ψ).
If we can show that MOC(ϕ)  ϕ, then by Compactness Theorem of modal
logic, there exists a finite set Γ ⊆MOC(ϕ) such that
∧
Γ  ϕ, i.e., 
∧
Γ→ ϕ.
Besides, the definition of MOC(ϕ) implies that ϕ 
∧
Γ, i.e.,  ϕ →
∧
Γ, and
thus 
∧
Γ↔ ϕ. Since every γ ∈ Γ is a translation of an L(◦)-formula, so is Γ.
Then we are done.
Assume that M, s  MOC(ϕ), to show that M, s  ϕ. Let Σ = {t(ψ) |
ψ ∈ L(◦),M, s  t(ψ)}. We now claim Σ ∪ {ϕ} is satisfiable: otherwise, by
Compactness Theorem of modal logic again, there exists finite Σ′ ⊆ Σ such that
ϕ  ¬
∧
Σ′, thus ¬
∧
Σ′ ∈MOC(ϕ). By assumption, we obtain M, s  ¬
∧
Σ′.
However, the definition of Σ and Σ′ ⊆ Σ implies M, s 
∧
Σ′, contradiction.
Thus we may assume that N , t  Σ∪{ϕ}. We can show (M, s) ≡◦ (N , t) as
follows: for any ψ ∈ L(◦), ifM, s  ψ, thenM, s  t(ψ), and then t(ψ) ∈ Σ, thus
N , t  t(ψ), hence N , t  ψ; if M, s 2 ψ, i.e., M, s  ¬ψ, then M, s  t(¬ψ),
and then t(¬ψ) ∈ Σ, thus N , t  t(¬ψ), hence N , t  ¬ψ, i.e. N , t 2 ψ.
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We now construct the ultrafilter extensions ofM and N , denoted by ue(M)
and ue(N ), respectively. According to the fact that (M, s) ≡◦ (N , t) and
Lemma 27, we have (ue(M), pis) ↔◦ (ue(N ), pit). Since N , t  ϕ, by Lemma
26, we have ue(N ), pit  ϕ. From supposition it follows that ue(M), pis  ϕ.
Using Lemma 26 again, we conclude that M, s  ϕ.
Theorem 29. A first-order formula is equivalent to an L(◦)-formula iff it is
invariant under ◦-bisimulation.
Proof. Based on Proposition 19, we need only show the direction from right
to left. For this, suppose that a first-order formula α is invariant under ◦-
bisimulation, then by Proposition 18, we have that α is also invariant under -
bisimulation. From van Benthem Characterization Theorem (Proposition 47), it
follows that α is equivalent to an L()-formula ϕ. From this and supposition, it
follows that ϕ is invariant under ◦-bisimulation. By Theorem 28, ϕ is equivalent
to an L(◦)-formula. Therefore, α is equivalent to an L(◦)-formula.
7 Axiomatizations
This section deals with the axiomatization for the logic L(◦) over various classes
of frames. We first handle the minimal system.
Definition 30 (Axiomatic system K◦). The axiomatic system K◦ consists of
all propositional tautologies (TAUT), uniform substitution (US), modus ponens
(MP), plus the following axioms and inference rule:
◦⊤ ◦⊤
◦¬ ¬p→ ◦p
◦∧ ◦p ∧ ◦q → ◦(p ∧ q)
R From ϕ→ ψ infer ◦ ϕ ∧ ϕ→ ◦ψ
A derivation from Γ to ϕ in K◦, notation: Γ ⊢K◦ ϕ, is a finite sequence of
L(◦)-formulas in which each formula is either an instantiation of an axiom, or
an element of Γ, or the result of applying an inference rule to prior formulas
in the sequence. Formula ϕ is provable in K◦, or a theorem, notation: ⊢ ϕ, if
there is a derivation from the empty set ∅ to ϕ in K◦.
Intuitively, Axiom ◦⊤ says that tautologies are not accidentally true (i.e.
¬ • ⊤); Axiom ◦¬ says that whatever is accidentally true is always true (i.e.
•p → p); Axiom ◦∧ says that if the conjunction is accidentally true, then at
least one conjunct thereof is accidentally true (i.e. •(p ∧ q)→ •p ∨ •q); Rule R
stipulates the almost monotonicity of the essence operator.
When it comes to completeness, any of the axioms ◦⊤, ◦¬ and ◦∧ is indis-
pensable in the system K◦, otherwise the subsystems will be not complete. As
for Axiom ◦⊤, define a nonstandard semantics  as , except that all formu-
las of the form ◦ϕ are interpreted as ¬ϕ. We can check under this semantics,
K◦ − ◦⊤ is sound, but ◦⊤ is not valid, which means that ◦⊤ is not provable
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in K◦ − ◦⊤. However, ◦⊤ is valid under the standard semantics . Therefore,
K◦ − ◦⊤ is not complete with respect to the semantics . As for Axiom ◦¬,
define another nonstandard semantics  as , except that all formulas of the
form ◦ϕ are interpreted as ϕ. One can show that under the semantics , the
subsystem K◦ − ◦¬ is sound, but ◦¬ is not valid. Thus there is a validity (i.e.
Axiom ◦¬) under the standard semantics , which is unprovable in K◦ − ◦¬,
and hence K◦ − ◦¬ is not complete with respect to the semantics .
As to the indispensability of Axiom ◦∧, the situation is more complicated.
For this, we need to switch the interpretations of ◦ and •, and the soundness
of a system is defined as “all of the theorems involved in the occurrence of ◦
are invalid”, where the notion of validity is defined as usual (see Definition 3).
Then one can check that under this specification, the subsystem K◦ − ◦∧ is
sound, but Axiom ◦∧ is valid, thus ◦∧ is not provable in K◦−◦∧. However, ◦∧
is valid under the semantics , hence K◦ − ◦∧ is not complete with respect to
the semantics .
From the indispensability of the axioms ◦⊤, ◦¬ and ◦∧, we have also shown
that all of the three axioms are independent in the system K◦.
Note that our axiomatic system K◦ is equivalent to, but slightly different
from Steinsvold’s BK in [13]. We can show easily that K
◦ is sound with respect
to the class of all frames.
Using Axiom ◦∧ and Rule US, we can show by induction on n ∈ N that
Proposition 31. ⊢ ◦ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ◦ϕn → ◦(ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ϕn).
We are now ready to build the canonical model for K◦.
Definition 32 (Canonical model for K◦). The model Mc = 〈Sc, Rc, V c〉 is the
canonical model of K◦, where
• Sc = {s | s is a maximal consistent set for K◦};
• For any s, t ∈ Sc, sRct iff (for all ϕ ∈ L(◦), if ◦ϕ ∧ ϕ ∈ s, then ϕ ∈ t)
and s 6= t;
• V c(p) = {s ∈ Sc | p ∈ s}.
The canonical model here is not reflexive, which is consistent with the se-
mantics of ◦, in contrast to the definition in [13] (see Section 8).
Lemma 33 (Truth Lemma). Let s ∈ Sc and ϕ ∈ L(◦). We have
Mc, s  ϕ⇐⇒ ϕ ∈ s.
Proof. By induction on ϕ. The only nontrivial case is ◦ϕ, that is to show,
Mc, s  ◦ϕ⇐⇒ ◦ϕ ∈ s.
‘⇐=’: Suppose towards contradiction that ◦ϕ ∈ s but Mc, s 2 ◦ϕ, then
s  ϕ but there is a t ∈ Sc with sRct and t 2 ϕ. By the induction hypothesis,
we have ϕ ∈ s but ϕ /∈ t. Thus ◦ϕ ∧ ϕ ∈ s. Since sRct, we obtain ϕ ∈ t,
contradiction.
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‘=⇒’: Suppose ◦ϕ /∈ s, to show Mc, s 2 ◦ϕ. By the induction hypothesis,
we need only show that ϕ ∈ s but there is a t ∈ Sc with sRct and ¬ϕ ∈ t. First,
ϕ ∈ s follows from the supposition ◦ϕ /∈ s, Axiom ◦¬ and Rule US. Besides, we
show that the set {ψ | ◦ψ ∧ ψ ∈ s} ∪ {¬ϕ} is consistent.
The proof proceeds as follows: if the set is not consistent, then there exist
ψ1, · · · , ψn ∈ {ψ | ◦ψ ∧ ψ ∈ s}3 such that ⊢ ψ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ψn → ϕ. Using Rule R,
we get ⊢ ◦(ψ1 ∧ · · · ∧ψn)∧ (ψ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ψn)→ ◦ϕ. From this and Proposition 31
follows that ⊢ ◦ψ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ◦ψn ∧ (ψ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ψn)→ ◦ϕ. Since ◦ψi ∧ ψi ∈ s for all
i ∈ [1, n], we have ◦ϕ ∈ s, contrary to the supposition.
We have thus shown that {ψ | ◦ψ ∧ψ ∈ s}∪ {¬ϕ} is consistent. By Linden-
baum’s Lemma, there is a t ∈ Sc such that {ψ | ◦ψ ∧ ψ ∈ s} ∪ {¬ϕ} ⊆ t. Since
ϕ ∈ s but ϕ /∈ t, we obtain s 6= t. Thus sRct and ¬ϕ ∈ t, as desired.
Based on Lemma 33, it is a standard exercise to show that
Theorem 34 (Completeness of K◦ over K-frames). K◦ is sound and strongly
complete with respect to the class of all frames.
The same story goes with K◦ and the class of serial frames. But note that
Mc is not necessarily serial. Thus we need to transformMc into a serial model,
in the meanwhile the truth-values of L(◦)-formulas should be preserved.
Theorem 35 (Completeness of K◦ over D-frames). K◦ is sound and strongly
complete with respect to the class of D-frames.
Proof. Define MD = 〈Sc, RD, V c〉, where Sc and V c is the same as in Defin-
ition 32, and RD = Rc ∪ {(t, t) | t is an endpoint in Mc}.4 Now it is obvious
that MD is serial.
It suffices to show that the truth-values of L(◦)-formulas are preserved under
the model transformation. That is to show: for all s ∈ Sc, for all ϕ ∈ L(◦), we
have Mc, s  ϕ iff MD, s  ϕ. The nontrivial case is ◦ϕ. If s is an endpoint in
Mc, then by semantics, Mc, s  ◦ϕ and MD, s  ◦ϕ, thus we have Mc, s  ◦ϕ
iff MD, s  ◦ϕ. If s is not an endpoint in Mc, then the claim is clear.
The same story also goes withK◦ and the class of reflexive frames. However,
according to the definition of Rc,Mc is not reflexive, thus we need to transform
Mc into a reflexive model. Notice that the truth-values of L(◦)-formulas should
be preserved under the model transformation.
Theorem 36 (Completeness of K◦ over T -frames). K◦ is sound and strongly
complete with respect to the class of T -frames.
Proof. Define Mc as in Definition 32. Define MT = 〈Sc, RT, V c〉 as Mc, ex-
cept that RT is the reflexive closure of Rc, i.e. RT = Rc ∪ {(s, s) | s ∈ Sc},
equivalently, sRTt iff (for all ϕ ∈ L(◦), if ◦ϕ ∧ ϕ ∈ s, then ϕ ∈ t) or s = t. It is
now obvious that RT is reflexive.
3Note that Axiom ◦⊤ provides the nonempty of the set {ψ | ◦ψ ∧ ψ ∈ s}.
4The method, called ‘reflexivizing the endpoints’, is also used in [4, Theorem 5.6].
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It suffices to show that the truth-values of L(◦)-formulas are preserved under
the model transformation. That is to show, for all s ∈ Sc, for all ϕ ∈ L(◦), we
have Mc, s  ϕ iff MT, s  ϕ. The proof proceeds with induction on ϕ. The
nontrivial case is ◦ϕ, as follows.
Mc, s  ◦ϕ
⇐⇒ Mc, s  ϕ implies for all t ∈ Sc, if sRct, then Mc, t  ϕ
⇐⇒ Mc, s  ϕ implies Mc, s  ϕ and for all t ∈ Sc, if sRct, then Mc, t  ϕ
IH
⇐⇒ MT, s  ϕ implies MT, s  ϕ and for all t ∈ Sc, if sRct, then MT, t  ϕ
sR
T
s
⇐⇒ MT, s  ϕ implies for all t ∈ Sc, if sRTt, then MT, t  ϕ
⇐⇒ MT, s  ◦ϕ.
We now consider the extensions of the systemK◦. The table below indicates
the extra axioms and the corresponding systems, with on the right-hand side
the classes of frames for which we will demonstrate completeness.
Notation Axioms Systems Frame classes
◦4 ◦p ∧ p→ ◦ ◦ p K4◦ = K◦ + ◦4 4 (S4)
◦B p→ ◦(◦¬p→ p) KB◦ = K◦ + ◦B B (T B)
◦5 ¬ ◦ ¬p→ ◦(◦¬p→ p) KB5◦ = KB◦ + ◦5 B5 (S5)
Note that Axiom ◦4 is different from the axiom B4 in [13, p. 95], i.e. ◦p∧p→
◦(◦p ∧ p). One can show that B4 is provable in K4◦, with the aid of Axioms
◦4, ◦∧ and Rule US. It is shown in [13, Prop. 3.6] that K◦ + B4 is sound
and complete with respect to the class of 4-frames (weakly transitive frames,
and also S4-frames). The same argument goes with the system K4◦. But we
will show that K4◦ is sound and strongly complete with respect to the class
of 4-frames within our framework. And we can see that K4◦ is simpler than
K◦ + B4.
We can compute the above axioms from the standard ones in modal logic.
But note that the point here is Proposition 4. In other words, the underlying
class of frames is FT , the class of reflexive frames, rather than the class of all
frames.
p→ p (1)
⇔ ◦ p ∧ p→ ◦(◦p ∧ p) ∧ (◦p ∧ p) (2)
⇔ ◦ p ∧ p→ ◦(◦p ∧ p) (3)
The equivalent transition from (1) to (2) follows from Proposition 4. By sim-
plification, we obtain the axiom B4 in [13, p. 95], i.e. (3).
p→ ♦p (4)
⇔ p→ (p ∨ ¬ ◦ ¬p) (5)
⇔ p→ (p ∨ ¬ ◦ ¬p) ∧ ◦(p ∨ ¬ ◦ ¬p) (6)
⇔ p→ ◦(◦¬p→ p) (7)
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The equivalent transitions from (4) to (6) follow from Proposition 4. By sim-
plification and using Rule RE◦ (i.e.
ϕ↔ ψ
◦ϕ↔ ◦ψ
), we obtain Axiom ◦B, i.e. (7).
♦p→ ♦p (8)
⇔ (p ∨ ¬ ◦ ¬p)→ ◦(p ∨ ¬ ◦ ¬p) ∧ (p ∨ ¬ ◦ ¬p) (9)
⇔ (p ∨ ¬ ◦ ¬p)→ ◦(◦¬p→ p) (10)
⇔ (p→ ◦(◦¬p→ p)) ∧ (¬ ◦ ¬p→ ◦(◦¬p→ p)) (11)
⇒ ¬ ◦ ¬p→ ◦(◦¬p→ p) (12)
The equivalent transition from (8) to (9) follows from Proposition 4. The equi-
valent transition from (10) to (11) is due to the validity of (ϕ∨ψ → χ)↔ (ϕ→
χ) ∧ (ψ → χ). The implicative (rather than equivalent) transition from (11) to
(12) is because Axiom ◦B is invalid on Euclidean frames. In this way, we get
the axiom (12), i.e. ◦5, or following the term in [13, p. 100], B5.
From the above transition from (8) to (12), we can see that the standard
axiom 5 in modal logic is equivalent to ◦B & ◦ 5, rather than ◦5. This tells us
that ◦B & ◦ 5 is the desired axiom for characterizing the logic of essence and
accident over symmetric and Euclidean frames, but ◦5 may not be the desired
axiom for characterizing this logic over Euclidean frames, as one can show.5
When considering the case for transitivity, the difficulty will arise. Because
it is possible that sRct and tRcu and u = s. By the definition of Rc, we do not
have sRcu. We call this kind of world s (viz. u) a non-transitive world w.r.t.
Rc. Thus we need to transform Mc into a transitive model. Notice that the
truth-values of L(◦)-formulas should be preserved under the transformation.
Theorem 37 (Completeness ofK4◦ over 4-frames). K4◦ is sound and strongly
complete with respect to the class of 4-frames.
Proof. Define Mc as in Definition 32 w.r.t. K4◦. Define MTr = 〈Sc, RTr, V c〉
as Mc, except that RTr = Rc ∪ {(s, s) | sRct, tRcs for some t ∈ Sc}.
We first show that RTr is transitive. Assume for any s, t, u ∈ Sc that sRTrt
and tRTru, to show sRTru. We consider the following cases.
• sRct and tRcu. If s = u, then by definition of RTr, it is obvious that
sRTru. We only need to consider s 6= u. In this case, suppose for any
ϕ ∈ L(◦) that ◦ϕ ∧ ϕ ∈ s, by Axiom ◦4 and Rule US, we get ◦ ◦ ϕ ∈ s.
Then from sRct, we can infer ◦ϕ ∧ ϕ ∈ t. Combining this and tRcu, we
obtain ϕ ∈ u. Therefore, sRcu, and thus sRTru.
• sRct, and for some s′, tRcs′ and s′Rcu and t = u. Then it is obvious that
sRcu, thus sRTru.
5In [13, page 101], the author claimed without a proof that BK +B5 is the logic of K5EA,
which means that BK + B5, equivalently, our K
◦ + ◦5, is sound and complete with respect
to the class of Euclidean frames. However, by using his canonical model (see also Section 8),
we cannot see how the canonical relation therein is provided to be Euclidean.
17
• for some s′ ∈ Sc, sRcs′ and s′Rct and s = t, and tRcu. Then it is obvious
that sRcu, thus sRTru.
• for some s′, s′′ ∈ Sc, sRcs′ and s′Rct and s = t, and tRcs′′ and s′′Rcu and
t = u. Then sRcs′ and s′Rcu and s = u for some s′ ∈ Sc. Thus sRTru.
Either case implies sRTru.
It suffices to show that the truth-values of L(◦)-formulas are preserved under
the model transformation. That is to show, for any s ∈ Sc, for any ϕ ∈ L(◦),
we have: Mc, s  ϕ⇐⇒MTr, s  ϕ. The proof proceeds with induction on ϕ.
The nontrivial case is ◦ϕ. If s is not a non-transitive world w.r.t. Rc, then the
claim is clear. Otherwise, i.e., if s is a non-transitive world w.r.t. Rc, then
Mc, s  ◦ϕ
⇐⇒ Mc, s  ϕ implies for all t ∈ Sc, if sRct, then Mc, t  ϕ
⇐⇒ Mc, s  ϕ implies Mc, s  ϕ and for all t ∈ Sc, if sRct, then Mc, t  ϕ
IH
⇐⇒ MTr, s  ϕ implies MTr, s  ϕ and for all t ∈ Sc, if sRct, then MTr, t  ϕ
sR
Tr
s
⇐⇒ MTr, s  ϕ implies for all t ∈ Sc, if sRTrt, then MTr, t  ϕ
⇐⇒ MTr, s  ◦ϕ.
According to the previous analysis, this completes the proof.
Theorem 38 (Completeness ofK4◦ over S4-frames). K4◦ is sound and strongly
complete with respect to the class of S4-frames.
Proof. Define MT as in the proof of Theorem 36 w.r.t. K4◦. By Theorem 36,
we only need to show that RT is transitive.
Suppose for any s, t, u ∈ Sc that sRTt and tRTu, to show sRTu. If s = u,
then it is clear that sRTu. We only need to consider the case where s 6= u. In
this case, according to the definition of RT, we consider the following subcases
(it is impossible that s = t and t = u, because in this case we already have
s 6= u).
• sRct and tRcu. Since s 6= u, by a similar argument to the corresponding
part of the first item in Theorem 37, we can obtain sRcu.
• sRct and t = u. It is obvious that sRcu.
• s = t and tRcu. It is obvious that sRcu.
Either case implies sRTu, which completes the proof.
For the completeness of KB◦, according to Theorem 34, we only need to
show that
Proposition 39. Rc is symmetric.
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Proof. Let s, t ∈ Sc. Suppose sRct (thus s 6= t), to show tRcs. For this, assume
for any ϕ such that ◦ϕ ∧ ϕ ∈ t, we need only show ϕ ∈ s. If ϕ /∈ s, i.e.
¬ϕ ∈ s, then using Axiom ◦B and Rule US, we obtain ◦(◦¬¬ϕ → ¬ϕ) ∈ s,
viz. ◦(◦ϕ → ¬ϕ) ∈ s. Besides, from ¬ϕ ∈ s it follows that ◦ϕ → ¬ϕ ∈ s.
We have thus shown that ◦(◦ϕ → ¬ϕ) ∧ (◦ϕ → ¬ϕ) ∈ s. By supposition and
the definition of Rc, we conclude that ◦ϕ → ¬ϕ ∈ t, that is, ◦ϕ ∧ ϕ /∈ t, in
contradiction to the assumption. Therefore ϕ ∈ s.
From Proposition 10, Theorem 34 and Proposition 39, it is immediate that
Theorem 40 (Completeness ofKB◦ over B-frames). KB◦ is sound and strongly
complete with respect to the class of B-frames.
Theorem 41 (Completeness of KB◦ over T B-frames). KB◦ is sound and
strongly complete with respect to the class of T B-frames.
Proof. Define MT as in the proof of Theorem 36 w.r.t. KB◦. By Theorem 36,
we need only show that RT is symmetric.
Let s, t ∈ Sc. Suppose sRTt, to show tRTs. By supposition, sRct or s = t.
If sRct, then by a similar argument to Proposition 39, we can show that tRcs;
if s = t, then t = s. Either case implies tRTs, as desired.
As we mentioned in the footnote 5, system K◦ + ◦5 may not be complete
with respect to the class of Euclidean frames. Despite this, we indeed have the
following result, i.e. Theorem 42. For this, however, we cannot provide that the
canonical relation Rc in Definition 32 is Euclidean, since it may be the case that
sRct and sRcu but t = u (thus it does not hold that tRcu). We call this kind of
world a non-Euclidean world w.r.t. Rc. We need to handle these special worlds,
to transform Mc into an Euclidean model. Note that the transformation need
to keep the symmetry of Rc, and also preserve the truth-values of L(◦)-formulas.
Theorem 42 (Completeness of KB5◦ over B5-frames). KB5◦ is sound and
strongly complete with respect to the class of B5-frames.
Proof. The validity of Axiom ◦5 can be derived from a similar argument to
Proposition 12.2, and the soundness of KB◦ follows from Theorem 40.
Define Mc as in Definition 32 w.r.t. KB5◦. Define MEuc = 〈Sc, REuc, V c〉
as Mc, except that REuc = Rc ∪ {(t, t) | sRct for some s ∈ Sc}.
We first show REuc is Euclidean. Assume for any s, t, u ∈ Sc that sREuct
and sREucu, to show that tREucu. According to the definition of REuc, we
consider the following cases.
• sRct and sRcu. Consider two subcases.
– t = u. It is obvious that tREucu.
– t 6= u. Suppose for any ϕ that ◦ϕ ∧ ϕ ∈ t, we need to show ϕ ∈ u,
from which we have tRcu. Since Rc is symmetric (Proposition 39),
from sRct it follows that tRcs. Then the supposition implies ϕ ∈ s.
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Moreover, we have ◦ϕ ∈ s, for otherwise, ¬ ◦ ϕ ∈ s, by Axiom ◦5
and Rule US, ◦(◦ϕ→ ¬ϕ) ∈ s; we also have ◦ϕ→ ¬ϕ ∈ s, then from
sRct follows ◦ϕ → ¬ϕ ∈ t, contrary to the supposition. We have
thus shown ϕ ∧ ◦ϕ ∈ s. This entails ϕ ∈ u due to sRcu. Then tRcu,
and thus tREucu.
• sRct, and s′Rcs and s′Rcu and s = u for some s′ ∈ Sc. Then uRct. Since
Rc is symmetric (Proposition 39), we obtain tRcu, thus tREucu.
• sRcu, and s′Rcs and s′Rct and s = t for some s′ ∈ Sc. Then it is clear
that tRcu, thus tREucu.
• s′Rcs and s′Rct and s = t and s′′Rcs and s′′Rcu and s = u for some
s′, s′′ ∈ Sc. Then s′Rct, s′Rcu and t = u, thus tREucu.
We then show REuc is symmetric. Suppose for any s, t ∈ Sc that sREuct,
to show tREucs. By supposition, we have either sRct, or s′Rcs, s′Rct, s = t for
some s′ ∈ Sc. If sRct, by Proposition 39, we have tRcs; if s′Rcs, s′Rct, s = t for
some s′ ∈ Sc, then s′Rct, s′Rcs, t = s. Either case implies tREucs.
It suffices to show: for any s ∈ Sc, for any ϕ ∈ L(◦), we have Mc, s 
ϕ ⇐⇒ MEuc, s  ϕ. That is to say, the truth-values of L(◦)-formulas are
preserved under the transformation. The proof proceeds with induction on ϕ.
The nontrivial case is ◦ϕ. If s is a non-Euclidean world w.r.t. Rc, then by
semantics, Mc, s  ◦ϕ is equivalent to (Mc, s  ϕ implies for all t ∈ Sc, if
sRct, then Mc, t  ϕ), which is equivalent to (Mc, s  ϕ implies Mc, s  ϕ
and for all t ∈ Sc, if sRct, then Mc, t  ϕ). By induction hypothesis, this is
equivalent to (MEuc, s  ϕ implies MEuc, s  ϕ and for all t ∈ Sc, if sRct,
thenMEuc, t  ϕ). Since sREucs, this is equivalent to (MEuc, s  ϕ implies for
all t ∈ Sc, if sREuct, then MEuc, t  ϕ), which means exactly MEuc, s  ◦ϕ.
Otherwise, i.e., if s is not a non-Euclidean world w.r.t. Rc, then it is obvious
that Mc, s  ◦ϕ⇐⇒MEuc, s  ◦ϕ.
Theorem 43 (Completeness of KB5◦ over S5-frames). KB5◦ is sound and
strongly complete with respect to the class of S5-frames.
Proof. DefineMT as in the proof of Theorem 36 w.r.t. KB5◦. By Theorem 41,
we need only show that RT is Euclidean.
Suppose for any s, t, u ∈ Sc such that sRTt and sRTu, to show tRTu. If s =
t, obviously tRTu. If s = u, then uRTt. Since RT is symmetric (Theorem 41),
we have tRTu. If t = u, by the definition of RT, we also have tRTu. So we
only need to consider the case where s 6= t and s 6= u and t 6= u. Then sRct and
sRcu. Analogous to the corresponding part of the first item in Theorem 42, we
can infer tRcu, thus tRTu, as desired.
8 Comparison with the literature
Various axiomatizations for the logic L(◦) have been proposed in the literature.
Inspired by [9], a function D is defined in [11], as D(s) = {ϕ | ◦(ϕ ∨ ψ) ∈
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s for every ψ} and then sRct holds just in case D(s) ⊆ t. The function is
simplified as D(s) = {ϕ | ◦ϕ ∧ ϕ ∈ s} in [13]. In [10, Prop. 4.1], a proof system
GS0 is established and shown to be complete, by proving GS0 is equivalent to
KEA in [11].
The canonical relation in [11] may not apply to some other frame classes,
just as the canonical relation defined in [9] in the setting of noncontingency logic
(cf. [4, p. 101]). We here compare our method to that proposed in [13] more
detailedly, where, to show the completeness of BK (an equivalent axiomatization
of K◦) and its extensions, the canonical model Mc = 〈Sc, Rc, V c〉 is defined as
follows:
• Sc = {s | s is a maximal consistent set for K◦};
• For any s, t ∈ Sc, sRct iff for all ϕ ∈ L(◦), if ◦ϕ ∧ ϕ ∈ s, then ϕ ∈ t;
• V c(p) = {s ∈ Sc | p ∈ s}.
Under this definition, the completeness proof is simpler than ours. However,
this definition has its defect: on one hand, the canonical relation, thus the
canonical frame, is automatically provided to be reflexive; on the other hand,
the semantics of L(◦) is defined on arbitrary frames, rather than on reflexive
frames, and it is also shown in [13, Prop. 3.5] that BK , equivalently, our K
◦,
is sound and complete with respect to the class of all frames. This means that
there is a non-correspondence between syntax and semantics in the logic of
essence and accident.
In comparison, by defining the canonical relation Rc as in Definition 32, we
do avoid the defect existing in [13], since our Mc is not reflexive.
Besides, our system K4◦ is simpler than K◦ +B4. And moreover, by using
a translation from L() to L(◦) on reflexive frames, we obtain a complete ax-
iomatization for symmetric frames, which, to our knowledge, is missing in the
literature. We also have studied the model theory of L(◦), including the ex-
pressive power, frame definability, the proposed suitable notions of bisimulation
and bisimulation contraction.
9 Closing words
In this paper, we compared the relative expressivity of the logic of essence and
accident L(◦) and modal logic, and study the frame definability of L(◦). We
proposed a notion of bisimulation for L(◦), based on which we characterized
this logic within modal logic and within first-order logic. We axiomatized the
logic of essence and accident over various classes of frames, with a more suitable
method than those in the literature. We found a method to compute certain
axioms used to axiomatize this logic over special frames in the literature. As a
side effect, we answered some open questions raised in [11].
As we claimed before, ◦5 may not be the desired axiom for characteriz-
ing L(◦) over Euclidean frames. We suspect that the validity ◦5′, i.e. ¬p →
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◦(◦¬p→ p), on Euclidean frames is not provable in K◦ + ◦5. Besides, We con-
jecture that K◦ + ◦5′ is sound and strongly complete with respect to the class
of Euclidean frames. We leave this for future work.
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A Omitted proofs
Proof of Proposition 12:
For item 1, suppose F  ∀x∀y∀z(xRy∧ yRz∧x 6= y∧ y 6= z∧x 6= z → xRz), to
show F  ◦p ∧ p → ◦(◦p ∧ p). Assume, for a contradiction, that F 2 ◦p ∧ p →
◦(◦p ∧ p), then there exists M = 〈S,R, V 〉 based on F and s ∈ S such that
M, s  ◦p ∧ p but s 2 ◦(◦p ∧ p). It follows that there is a t ∈ S such that sRt
and t 2 ◦p ∧ p, thus s 6= t. Since s  ◦p ∧ p, we have t  p, and then t 2 ◦p,
hence there is a u ∈ S such that tRu and u 2 p, and furthermore t 6= u and
s 6= u. Now by supposition, we obtain sRu. However, from s  ◦p∧ p and sRu,
we get u  p, contradiction.
Now suppose F 2 ∀x∀y∀z(xRy ∧ yRz ∧ x 6= y ∧ y 6= z ∧ x 6= z → xRz),
to show F 2 ◦p ∧ p → ◦(◦p ∧ p). By supposition, there are s, t, u such that
sRt, tRu, s 6= t, t 6= u, s 6= u but not sRu. Define a valuation V on F = 〈S,R〉
such that V (p) = {s} ∪ {s′ ∈ S | sRs′}. By definition, 〈F, V 〉, s  p and for all
s′ such that sRs′ we have s′  p, thus s  ◦p ∧ p. Since sRt, we have t  p.
Since s 6= u and not sRu, we obtain u 2 p. From tRu and t  p but u 2 p, it
follows that t 2 ◦p, and then t 2 ◦p ∧ p. From this, sRt and s  ◦p ∧ p, we get
s 2 ◦(◦p ∧ p). Therefore s 2 ◦p ∧ p→ ◦(◦p ∧ p), and we can now conclude that
F 2 ◦p ∧ p→ ◦(◦p ∧ p).
For item 2, suppose F  ∀x∀y∀z(xRy ∧ xRz ∧ x 6= y ∧ x 6= z ∧ y 6= z →
yRz), to show F  ¬ ◦ ¬p → ◦(◦¬p → p). Assume, for a contradiction, that
F 2 ¬ ◦ ¬p → ◦(◦¬p → p), then there exists M = 〈S,R, V 〉 based on F such
that M, s  ¬ ◦ ¬p but s 2 ◦(◦¬p → p). It follows that there is a t ∈ S such
that sRt and t 2 ◦¬p → p, i.e. t  ◦¬p ∧ ¬p. Since s  ¬ ◦ ¬p, we have s  ¬p
and there is a u ∈ S such that sRu and u  p. It is not hard to check that
s 6= t, s 6= u and t 6= u. Now by supposition, we obtain tRu. However, from
t  ◦¬p ∧ ¬p and tRu, we get u  ¬p, i.e. u 2 p, contradiction.
Now suppose F 2 ∀x∀y∀z(xRy ∧ xRz ∧ x 6= y ∧ x 6= z ∧ y 6= z → yRz),
to show F 2 ¬ ◦ ¬p → ◦(◦¬p → p). By supposition, there are s, t, u such that
sRt, sRu, s 6= t, s 6= u, t 6= u but not tRu. Define a valuation V on F = 〈S,R〉
such that V (p) = {u}. By definition and s 6= u, t 6= u, we have s 2 p and t 2 p.
Given any t′ such that tRt′, due to not tRu, we have t′ 6= u, thus t′ 2 p, and
hence t  ◦¬p ∧ ¬p, i.e. t 2 ◦¬p → p. From sRu, s  ¬p, u 2 ¬p, it follows
that s 2 ◦¬p, then s  ¬ ◦ ¬p and s  ◦¬p → p. Since sRt, we can show that
s 2 ◦(◦¬p→ p). Therefore s 2 ¬ ◦ ¬p→ ◦(◦¬p→ p), and we can now conclude
that F 2 ¬ ◦ ¬p→ ◦(◦¬p→ p).
Proof of Proposition 16:
Suppose that Z and Z ′ are both ◦-bisimulations on M, to show Z ∪ Z ′ is also
a ◦-bisimulation on M. Obviously, Z ∪ Z ′ is nonempty, since Z,Z ′ are both
non-empty. We need to check that Z ∪ Z ′ satisfies the three conditions of ◦-
bisimulation. For this, assume that (s, s′) ∈ Z ∪ Z ′. Then sZs′ or sZ ′s′.
(Inv): If sZs′, then as Z is a ◦-bisimulation, we have: given any p ∈ P,
s ∈ V (p) iff s′ ∈ V (p); if sZ ′s′, then as Z ′ is a ◦-bisimulation, we also have:
given any p ∈ P, s ∈ V (p) iff s′ ∈ V (p). In both case we have that given any
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p ∈ P, s ∈ V (p) iff s′ ∈ V (p).
(◦-Forth): Suppose that sRt and (s, t) /∈ Z ∪ Z ′, then (s, t) /∈ Z and (s, t) /∈
Z ′. If sZs′, then since Z is a ◦-bisimulation on M, there exists t′ such that
s′Rt′ and (t, t′) ∈ Z, and hence (t, t′) ∈ Z ∪ Z ′; if sZ ′s′, then since Z ′ is a
◦-bisimulation on M, there exists t′ such that s′Rt′ and (t, t′) ∈ Z ′, and hence
also (t, t′) ∈ Z ∪Z ′. Therefore in both cases, there exists t′ such that s′Rt′ and
(t, t′) ∈ Z ∪ Z ′.
(◦-Back): The proof is similar to that of (◦-Forth).
Proof of Proposition 17:
We need only show that ↔◦ satisfies the three properties of an equivalence
relation.
Reflexivity: Given any model M = 〈S,R, V 〉 and s ∈ S, to show that
(M, s) ↔◦ (M, s). For this, define Z = {(w,w) | w ∈ S}. First, Z is
nonempty, as sZs. We need only show that Z satisfies the three conditions
of ◦-bisimulation. Suppose that wZw.
It is obvious that w and w satisfy the same propositional variables, thus
(Inv) holds; suppose that wRt and (w, t) /∈ Z for some t ∈ S, then obviously,
there exists t′ = t such that wRt′ and tZt′, thus (◦-Forth) holds; the proof of
(◦-Back) is analogous.
Symmetry: Given any models M = 〈S,R, V 〉 and M′ = 〈S′, R′, V ′〉 and
s ∈ S and s′ ∈ S′, assume that (M, s) ↔◦ (M′, s′), to show that (M′, s′) ↔◦
(M, s). By assumption, we have that there exists ◦-bisimulation Z with sZs′.
Define Z ′ = {(w,w′) | w ∈ S, w′ ∈ S′, w′Zw} ∪ {(w, t) | w, t ∈ S, wZt} ∪
{(w′, t′) | w′, t′ ∈ S′, w′Zt′}. First, since sZs′, we have (s′, s) ∈ Z ′, thus Z ′
is nonempty. We need only check that Z ′ satisfies the three conditions of ◦-
bisimulation. Suppose that wZ ′w′.
By supposition, we have w′Zw. Using (Inv) of Z, we have that w′ and w
satisfy the same propositional variables, then of course w and w′ satisfy the
same propositional variables, thus (Inv) holds. For (◦-Forth), suppose that wRt
and (w, t) /∈ Z ′ for some t ∈ S, then by definition of Z ′, (w, t) /∈ Z. Using
(◦-Back) of Z, we infer that there exists t′ ∈ S′ such that w′R′t′ and t′Zt, thus
tZ ′t′. The proof of (◦-Back) is similar, by using (◦-Forth) of Z.
Transitivity: Given any models M = 〈SM, RM, VM〉, N = 〈SN , RN , V N 〉,
O = 〈SO, RO, V O〉 and s ∈ SM, t ∈ SN , u ∈ SO, assume that (M, s) ↔◦
(N , t) and (N , t) ↔◦ (O, u), to show that (M, s) ↔◦ (O, u). By assumption,
we have that there exists ◦-bisimulation Z1 on the disjoint union of M and N
such that sZ1t, and there exists ◦-bisimulation Z2 on the disjoint union of N
and O such that tZ2u. We need to find a ◦-bisimulation Z on the disjoint union
of M and O.
Define Z = {(x, z) | x ∈ SM, z ∈ SO, there is a y ∈ SN such that xZ1y,
yZ2z} ∪ {(x, x
′) | x, x′ ∈ SM, xZ1x
′} ∪ {(z, z′) | z, z′ ∈ SO, zZ2z
′} ∪ {(x, x′) |
x, x′ ∈ SM, there are y, y′ ∈ SN such that yZ2y′, xZ1y, x′Z1y′} ∪ {(z, z′) |
z, z′ ∈ SO, there are y, y′ ∈ SN such that yZ1y′, yZ2z, y′Z2z′}. First, since
sZ1t and tZ2u, by the first part of the definition of Z, we have sZu, thus Z
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is nonempty. We need only check that Z satisfies the three conditions of ◦-
bisimulation. Suppose that xZz. Then by the first part of the definition of Z,
there is a y ∈ SN such that xZ1y and yZ2z.
(Inv): as Z1 and Z2 are both ◦-bisimulations, x and y satisfy the same
propositional variables, and y and z satisfy the same propositional variables.
Then x and z satisfy the same propositional variables.
(◦-Forth): suppose that xRMx′ and (x, x′) /∈ Z for some x′ ∈ SM, then by
the second part of the definition of Z, we obtain (x, x′) /∈ Z1. From this, xZ1y
and (◦-Forth) of Z1, it follows that there exists y′ ∈ SN such that yRNy′ and
x′Z1y
′. Using xZ1y, x
′Z1y
′, (x, x′) /∈ Z and the fourth part of the definition of
Z, we get (y, y′) /∈ Z2. From this, yZ2z and (◦-Forth) of Z2, it follows that
there exists z′ ∈ SO such that zROz′ and y′Z2z′. Since x′Z1y′ and y′Z2z′, by
the first part of the definition of Z, we obtain x′Zz′. We have shown that, there
exists z′ ∈ SO such that zROz′ and x′Zz′, as desired.
(◦-Back): the proof is similar to that of (◦-Forth), but in this case we use
the third and fifth parts of the definition of Z, rather than the second or fourth
parts of the definition of Z.
Proof of Proposition 24:
Define Z = {([w], w) | w ∈ S} ∪ {([w], [v]) | w, v ∈ S,w ↔◦ v}. First, since S is
nonempty, Z is nonempty. We need to show that Z satisfies the three conditions
of ◦-bisimulation, which entails ([M], [s])↔◦ (M, s). Assume that [w]Zw.
(Inv): by the definition of [V ].
(◦-Forth): suppose that [w][R][v] and ([w], [v]) /∈ Z, then by definition of [R],
there exist w′ ∈ [w] and v′ ∈ [v] such that w′Rv′. As [w] = [w′] and [v] = [v′],
we get from the supposition that ([w′], [v′]) /∈ Z. By definition of Z, we obtain
w′ 6↔◦ v
′. Because ↔◦ is a ◦-bisimulation, from w ↔◦ w
′ it follows that there
exists u such that wRu and u↔◦ v′, thus [u] = [v′] = [v]. It is clear that [u]Zu,
that is, [v]Zu.
(◦-Back): suppose that wRv and (w, v) /∈ Z. By definition of [R], we have
[w][R][v]. Obviously, [v]Zv.
Proof of Proposition 25:
Suppose that M = 〈S,R, V 〉 is an S5-model, to show that [M] = 〈[S], [R], [V ]〉
is also an S5-model. We need to show that [R] is an equivalence relation, that
is, [R] satisfies the properties of reflexivity, symmetry and transitivity. The
nontrivial case is transitivity. For this, given any [s], [t], [u] ∈ [S], assume that
[s][R][t] and [t][R][u], we need only show that [s][R][u].
By assumption and the definition of [R], there exists s′ ∈ [s], t′ ∈ [t] such
that s′Rt′, and there exists t′′ ∈ [t], u′ ∈ [u] such that t′′Ru′. We now consider
two cases:
• t′′ ↔◦ u
′. In this case, we have [t′′] = [u], then [t] = [u], thus [s][R][u].
• t′′ 6↔◦ u
′. In this case, using t′ ↔◦ t
′′ (as t′ ∈ [t] and t′′ ∈ [t]) and the
fact that ↔◦ is a ◦-bisimulation, we obtain that there exists u′′ such that
t′Ru′′ and u′′ ↔◦ u′, thus u′′ ∈ [u′] = [u]. Moreover, From s′Rt′, t′Ru′′
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and the transitivity of R, it follows that s′Ru′′. We have thus shown that
there exists s′ ∈ [s], u′′ ∈ [u] with s′Ru′′, therefore [s][R][u].
In both cases we have [s][R][u], as desired.
B Preliminaries
Definition 44 (Ultrafilter Extension). Let M = 〈S,R, V 〉 be a model. We say
that ue(M) = 〈Uf(S), Rue, V ue〉 is the ultrafilter extension of M, if
• Uf(S) = {u | u is an ultrafilter over S}, where an ultrafilter u ⊆ ℘(S)
satisfies the following properties:
– S ∈ u, ∅ /∈ u,
– X,Y ∈ u implies X ∩ Y ∈ u,
– X ∈ u and X ⊆ Z ⊆ S implies Z ∈ u
– For all X ∈ P(S), X ∈ u iff −X /∈ u (−X means the complement of
X)
• For all s, t ∈ Uf(S), sRuet iff for all X ⊆ S, X ∈ t implies λ(X) ∈ s,
where λ(X) = {w ∈ S | there exists v such that wRv and v ∈ X}
• V ue(p) = {u ∈ Uf(S) | V (p) ∈ u}.
Definition 45 (Principle Ultrafilter). Let S be a nonempty set. Given any
s ∈ S, the principle ultrafilter pis generated by s is defined as pis = {X ⊆ S |
s ∈ X}. It can be shown that every principle ultrafilter is an ultrafilter.
Proposition 46. Let M be a model and ue(M) be its ultrafilter extension.
Then ue(M) is L()-saturated and (M, s) ≡ (ue(M), pis).
Theorem 47 (van Benthem Characterization Theorem). A first-order formula
is equivalent to an L()-formula iff it is invariant under -bisimulation.
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